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LOANS AND MARKETING GUARANTEES IN
ATHLETE AGENT RECRUITING: WHY
THEY ARE ILL-ADVISED UNDER
AGENCY LAW AND ATTORNEY
ETHICS REGULATIONS PRINCIPLES
By: Joshua Lens*
Athlete agents use various means to recruit prospective clients. Controver-
sial yet common methods include offering loans and marketing guarantees to
prospective clients. In each transaction, the agent provides his client with
money, in some cases amounting to millions of dollars. The agent typically
expects repayment of the loan whereas the marketing guarantee is an advance
on future marketing income that the agent will arrange for the athlete. While
both National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”) agent regula-
tions and state athlete agent laws prohibit agents from offering inducements to
prospective clients, neither authority considers loans or marketing guarantees
illicit or prohibits them.
This Article details the use of loans and marketing guarantees in the football
agent recruiting process. The Article also explores both NFLPA and state ath-
lete agent law, which is based on the Uniform Athlete Agents Act or its revised
version’s prohibitions on athlete agents providing inducements to prospective
clients. It describes the fiduciary relationship between athlete agents and their
clients and the duties that result under agency law. Next, the Article applies
agency law to the provision of loans and marketing guarantees by athlete
agents to their clients, determining that agency law seeks to prohibit such
transactions. The Article then discusses the application of attorney ethics regu-
lations to attorneys who serve as athlete agents and provide loans and market-
ing guarantees, finding that attorney-agents who engage in this activity violate
ethics regulations. The Article concludes by explaining why both athlete agents
and athletes should be leery of these dealings and by urging the NFLPA and
individual states to expressly prohibit them.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544 R
II. USE AND ROLE OF LOANS AND MARKETING
GUARANTEES IN ATHLETE AGENT RECRUITING . . . . . . . . 546 R
III. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT AUTHORITIES TO
SCENARIO WHEREBY AN ATHLETE AGENT PROVIDES A
LOAN OR MARKETING GUARANTEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551 R
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V7.I3.2
* Joshua Lens is a Clinical Assistant Professor in the Recreation and Sport Man-
agement program at the University of Arkansas (J.D., University of Iowa College of
Law; B.A., University of Northern Iowa). Prior to entering academia, Joshua prac-
ticed civil litigation and then spent seven years on Baylor University’s athletics com-
pliance staff, during which time he had the privilege of overseeing the university’s
agent administration program. Several student-athletes and their families honored
Joshua by including him in their agent selection process. Any views expressed in this
Article are the Author’s and are not necessarily representative of the University of
Arkansas or Baylor University.
543
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-3\TWL305.txt unknown Seq: 2 14-APR-20 15:28
544 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
A. Application of NFLPA Regulations to Loans and
Marketing Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552 R
B. Application of State Athlete Agent Laws to Loans
and Marketing Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556 R
C. Application of Agency Law to Loans and Marketing
Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557 R
D. Application of Attorney Ethics Regulations to
Attorney-Agents Who Offer Loans and Marketing
Guarantees to Prospective Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562 R
1. The Model Rules Prohibit Attorneys from
Entering Business Transactions with Clients
Absent Certain Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 R
2. With Limited Exceptions, the Model Rules
Prohibit Attorneys from Providing Financial
Assistance to Clients in Connection with
Pending or Contemplated Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . 567 R
IV. CONCLUSION: BASED ON AGENCY LAW AND ATTORNEY
ETHICS REGULATIONS RATIONALES, ATHLETES AND
AGENTS SHOULD BE LEERY OF ENGAGING IN LOAN
AND MARKETING GUARANTEE TRANSACTIONS, AND
THE NFLPA AND INDIVIDUAL STATES SHOULD
EXPRESSLY PROHIBIT THEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571 R
I. INTRODUCTION1
At the conclusion of his junior season of collegiate eligibility, a
draft-eligible defensive lineman considers leaving his university early
and entering the upcoming NFL draft. The lineman and his family
begin gathering material that will aid in the decision, the university’s
head coach solicits information on the lineman’s strengths and weak-
nesses and projected draft position from NFL contacts, the lineman
and his family monitor the number of other defensive linemen eligible
for the draft, and the lineman obtains a projection from the NFL Col-
lege Advisory Committee.2 As the lineman and his family collect this
information, they decide to meet with and interview athlete agents to
1. While a college athletics administrator, I helped dozens of student-athletes at
multiple universities with their agent selection process. This scenario closely
resembles actual events of one such selection process.
2. Draft-eligible underclassmen may request a pre-draft projection from the NFL
College Advisory Committee, which is made up of professional and team scouts. See
NFLPA Pipeline to the Pros, https://www.nflpa.com/pipeline (last visited Mar. 1,
2020) [https://perma.cc/LH9S-G8FP] (outlining resources available to student-athletes
considering leaving school early for the NFL draft). For information on how a draft-
eligible underclass student-athlete should successfully transition from a collegiate to
professional football career while maintaining compliance with NCAA rules, see
Mike Rogers, Paving the Road Between NCAA Stardom and an NFL Career: A Uni-
versity Advisory Panel Perspective, 19 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 187, 212–13
(2016) (reviewing “stay” and “go” factors for former top early-entry NFL draft selec-
tions such as Jason Smith and Robert Griffin, III).
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both learn more about the business side of professional football and
select and sign with an agent should the lineman decide to enter the
draft.3
The lineman and his parents, coaches, and athletics department ad-
ministrators collaborate and discuss characteristics they would like a
potential athlete agent to possess. The lineman researches various ath-
lete agents, talks to acquaintances who play in the NFL about their
agent representation, and ultimately invites five successful and reputa-
ble athlete agents to campus for interviews. The first four meetings go
as anticipated—the agents pitch their services to the lineman and his
family, boast about the number of first-round draft picks among their
clientele, show statistics regarding the millions of dollars in contracts
they negotiated on behalf of clients, explain the pre-draft process, and
discuss the draft itself. Each agent expresses gratitude to the family
for the organized and fair selection process and tells tales of being
disadvantaged when recruiting some other athletes who signed with
the athlete agent willing to pay the most.
The final meeting ends with a twist, however. After giving a recruit-
ing pitch similar to the other agents, this athlete agent dramatically
states, “I have such confidence that we would be a great fit together
and you’ll be drafted highly that I’m willing to put my money where
my mouth is and offer you a marketing guarantee of $250,000.” The
lineman and his family exchange confused looks and express incom-
prehension. The athlete agent explains that if the lineman decides to
leave school early and retain the athlete agent for both contract nego-
tiation and marketing representation, the athlete agent will pay the
lineman $250,000 up front as an advance against future marketing
income.
The lineman’s middle-class parents express agitation that this ath-
lete agent believes their son could be bought with what seems like a
loan. The athlete agent explains that the lineman will never have to
repay him any of the money, that it is an advance on future marketing
income and if the athlete agent arranges marketing income for the
lineman amounting to less than $250,000, the agency will be on the
hook for the difference. The lineman’s folks remain concerned with
and confused about this offer, now considering it more akin to a cash
payment or bribe. The athlete agent counters that if the lineman’s par-
ents feel more comfortable with their son repaying the $250,000, the
parties can treat the payment as a loan—the athlete agent was simply
3. In this example, the lineman wishes to preserve his NCAA competition eligi-
bility in case he decides to return to his university for his senior season. Thus, while he
will meet with athlete agents, he will not sign with one until he concludes he will leave
school early and enter the draft because, under NCAA regulations, football student-
athletes who sign with athlete agents forfeit their competition eligibility. See NCAA,
2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.3.1 (Aug. 2018), http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D118D119.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA57-NMN5].
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trying to get some money in the lineman’s pocket as it will be several
months before the lineman receives a paycheck from his future NFL
organization. The lineman’s parents want to research the permissibil-
ity of athlete agents providing marketing guarantees and loans and,
perhaps just as importantly, engage in some soul-searching to deter-
mine how they feel about the ethics of the offers. The lineman and his
family thank the athlete agent for the meeting, agree to consider the
athlete agent’s pitch and offers, and promise to remain in contact.
Part II of this Article explores marketing guarantees and loans and
how athlete agents use them in the recruiting process. Part III pro-
vides answers to the lineman’s parents’ concerns about whether loans
and marketing guarantees violate the National Football League Play-
ers Association (“NFLPA”) regulations and state athlete agent laws.
Additionally, Part III analyzes considerations the lineman’s parents
did not contemplate: the application of agency law and attorney ethics
regulations to these transactions. This Part concludes that agency law
and ethics regulations seek to prohibit athlete agents and attorneys
who serve as athlete agents from offering loans and marketing guaran-
tees. This Article concludes in Part IV by cautioning athletes and ath-
lete agents to refrain from entering into these transactions and, based
on the rationale of agency law and attorney ethics regulations, urging
the NFLPA and individual states to expressly prohibit them.
II. USE AND ROLE OF LOANS AND MARKETING GUARANTEES IN
ATHLETE AGENT RECRUITING4
The athlete agent selection process is extremely important for stu-
dent-athletes. Although most athlete agents behave honestly and pro-
fessionally, there are those who do more harm than good.5 Hiring an
honest agent can be of extreme benefit to an athlete, while hiring a
dishonest agent can cause great harm to an athlete’s career.6 Athlete
agents are a leading cause of problems relating to student-athletes’
transitions into professional careers.7 The selection process can be
grueling and complicated, with Trent Richardson, former University
of Alabama running back and third overall pick in the 2012 NFL draft
4. While athlete agents offer loans and marketing guarantees to athletes who
participate in many sports, this Article focuses on athlete agents who represent and
offer loans and marketing guarantees to football players.
5. See Dave Anderson, Sports of the Times; Agents’ Schemes and Harmful Ef-
fects, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/19/sports/sports-
of-the-times-agents-schemes-and-harmful-effects.html [https://perma.cc/Z4WT-
CAG7] (explaining that an athlete agent’s harm can be blatantly wrong or a subtle
scheme and providing examples of each).
6. See id. (providing examples of agents’ dishonest acts).
7. See Glenn Wong, Warren Zola & Chris Deubert, Going Pro in Sports: Provid-
ing Guidance to Student-Athletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment,
28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553, 557 (2010) (noting agents are still a necessary
component of this process).
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saying it was “probably the hardest thing ever.”8 The process can
overwhelm student-athletes, who often receive fifty text messages and
twenty-five calls a day from athlete agents seeking to represent them.9
For athlete agents, player recruiting “is the lifeblood of the agent
business.”10 Thus, if they are not careful, athlete agents can spend
more time recruiting potential clients than actually representing cur-
rent clients.11 Former athlete agent and NFL executive Andrew
Brandt describes agent recruiting as attempting to persuade a young
man he should sign with him instead of the many other agents at-
tempting to sign him.12 To football agent Pat Dye, Jr., recruiting is a
“job interview” in which he must sell himself to the student-athlete,
his potential client.13 For Dye, Jr., the “business is all about
relationships.”14
However, one football agent described player recruiting as “a shark
tank without any lifeguards.”15 David Ware, a longtime agent who
represented former NFL star Barry Sanders, characterized player
recruiting as “the wild, wild West.”16 This is due in large part to the
8. See Kevin Scarbinsky, Choosing an Agent: The Other Kind of Recruiting,
AL.COM (Mar. 11, 2012), https://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2012/03/post_345.html
[https://perma.cc/7KNS-GYED] (explaining that agent selection is hard because
agents tend to “tell[ ] you what you want to hear”).
9. Id. (likening agent recruiting to college coaches recruiting high school
athletes).
10. Andrew Brandt, Football’s Other Recruiting, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 19,
2013), https://www.si.com/2013/12/19/nfl-agents-recruit-draft-prospects [https://
perma.cc/33F3-33TL] (describing agent recruiting).
11. Richard T. Karcher, Solving Problems in the Player Representation Business:
Unions Should be the “Exclusive” Representatives of the Players, 42 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 737, 742 (2006) (proposing that players associations be more proactive in their
role as the “exclusive” representative of players).
12. See Brandt, supra note 10 (referring to the time period between the end of R
college football’s regular season and bowl season as “go time” for agent recruiting).
Brandt’s background includes serving as the contract advisor for NFL stars Matt Has-
selbeck, Adam Vinatieri, and Ricky Williams, prior to serving as the Green Bay Pack-
ers’ Vice President. See Andrew Brandt Biography, VILLANOVA U., https://www.1
villanovawww1.villanova.edu/villanova/law/academics/faculty/Facultyprofiles/Andrew
Brandt.html. (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TM5N-WYEN].
13. See Scarbinsky, supra note 8 (describing Pat Dye, Jr.’s background, which in- R
cludes being the son of Auburn University’s former head football coach and obtaining
his law degree). Dye, Jr. has more than thirty years of experience as an athlete agent.
See Pat Dye, Jr., SPORTSTRUST ADVISORS, https://www.sportstrust.com/team/pat-dye-
jr/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9R2R-JGAE].
14. See Scarbinsky, supra note 8 (providing example of Dye, Jr., an “Auburn grad” R
who signed former University of Alabama football student-athletes through leverag-
ing relationships with people associated with the University).
15. Id. (explaining that not all agents follow relevant authorities and the conse-
quence for agents who follow the rules is that they get a later start on developing
relationships with potential clients).
16. See Liz Mullen, Dirty Dealings Spark Debate, SPORTS BUS. J. (Apr. 19, 2004),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2004/04/19/Labor-Agents/Dirty-
Dealings-Spark-Debate.aspx [https://perma.cc/K49E-UPFY] (describing the state of
the agent industry and the possibility of new, tighter authorities).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-3\TWL305.txt unknown Seq: 6 14-APR-20 15:28
548 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
fact that there are many NFLPA-certified agents vying to represent
the few draftees and undrafted free agents.17 As many as thirty agents
may contend for the right to represent one prospect.18
The simple supply and demand of the industry can cause athlete
agents to act unduly aggressive to recruit and retain clients.19 Thus,
today’s climate “often includes bidding wars where athlete-agents
spend large sums of money to land a top player.”20 In other words,
player recruiting often comes down to an agent’s capital.21 Conse-
quently, recruiting tactics may include illicit behaviors such as provid-
ing materially false information or cash payments to a prospective
client and his family members.22 For example, one industry insider es-
timated that one-third of the players drafted in the first three rounds
17. See Leigh Steinberg, How to be a Great Sports Agent—Signing Prospects Part
I, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2016, 11:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2016/
12/03/how-to-be-a-great-sports-agent-signing-prospects-part-i?#7f5df1451d92 [https://
perma.cc/45Q4-6QLR] (noting that in 2017 there were nearly 1,000 NFLPA-certified
agents vying for representation of many fewer draftees and players who would go
undrafted); see also Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended
and Unintended Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 786 (2006) (advocating
for need of effective means of regulating agents due to harms on athletes as result of
agent misconduct).
18. See Eddie Matz, Agent of Change, ESPN (May 2, 2014), https://www.espn.
co.uk/nfl/draft2014/story/_/id/10872670/nfl-agent-kyle-strongin-made-remarkable-
strides-just-two-years-espn-magazine [https://perma.cc/AR2N-NPV3] (profiling agent
Kyle Strongin).
19. See James Masteralexis, Lisa Masteralexis & Kevin Snyder, Enough is
Enough: The Case for Federal Regulation of Sport Agents, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 69, 70 (2013) (describing the agent field as being full of risk and fraught
with ethical challenges). For years, competition in the industry has been so fierce that
some agents and union officials are concerned that agents are more focused on getting
and keeping clients than on doing well with their clients’ contracts. See Mullen, supra
note 16 (noting that agents are now “recruiting clients at younger ages, routinely R
stealing each other’s clients and filing lawsuits against one another at . . . a record
rate”).
20. Jason La Canfora, Time to Overhaul (Install?) System of NFL Player-Agent
Money Dealings, CBS SPORTS (June 11, 2014, 7:16 AM ET), https://www.cbssports.
com/nfl/news/time-to-overhaul-install-system-of-nfl-player-agent-money-dealings/
[https://perma.cc/9MWM-NDRH] (advocating reform of authorities governing
agents); see also Masteralexis et al., supra note 19, at 70 (noting it appears induce- R
ments are routine in the agent business).
21. See Steve Koesterman, The Money Behind the Pre-Draft Process, SPORTS
AGENT BLOG (Apr. 25, 2019), sportsagentblog.com/2019/04/25/the-money-behind-
the-pre-draft-process/ [https://perma.cc/X69W-LA5V] (describing common pre-draft
expenses). Now-deceased, longtime agent Eugene Parker lamented that athletes often
sign with the best recruiter as opposed to the best contract negotiator. See Mullen,
supra note 16. Agent Steve Persia agrees, stating his frustration with the current cli-
mate where athletes sign with the agent or agency offering the largest guarantee. See
Josh Corriveau, Interview with the Agent: Steve Persia, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Mar. 11,
2014), http://sportsagentblog.com/2014/03/11/interview-with-the-agent/-steve-persia/
[https://perma.cc/66CZ-JQJB] (wherein Persia states that competing against an agent
offering a marketing guarantee or other incentives is the most difficult and challeng-
ing aspect of recruiting).
22. See generally Joshua Lens, Application of the UAAA, RUAAA, and State Ath-
lete-Agent Laws to Corruption in Men’s College Basketball and Revisions Necessitated
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of the 2015 NFL draft received some type of illegal inducement from
their agents.23
Some top agencies will not engage in such dishonest behavior but
may offer something more innocuous but equally as powerful.24 Com-
mon agent recruiting tactics include offering a loan or a marketing
guarantee to a prospective client.25
Peers place a tremendous amount of pressure on athletes to “spend
lavishly and show off their wealth.”26 Perhaps taking advantage of this
pressure, agents who offer loans in the recruiting process make the
line of credit available to the athlete immediately upon signing.27 One
agent described the average loan for a potentially high draft pick as
being between $100,000 and $200,000 but had heard of a line of credit
as high as $500,000.28 Another estimate puts the range of loans
between $25,000 and $300,000 upon execution of a representation
agreement between the agent and athlete.29 A different agent identi-
fied a seventh-round draft pick who received a line of credit of
$50,000.30
Marketing guarantees have recently emerged in the agent recruiting
industry.31 And they have already developed a negative reputation.32
In 2004, agents characterized marketing guarantees as “out of con-
by NCAA Rule Changes, 30 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 47 (2019) (describing application
of state athlete agent laws to corruption in men’s college basketball).
23. See Neil Stratton, Paying Players, SUCCEED IN FOOTBALL – THE DAILY BLOG
WRITTEN BY INSIDE THE LEAGUE’S NEIL STRATTON (Dec. 30, 2015), https://succeedin
football.com/2152015/12/30/paying-players/ [https://perma.cc/E6U3-CZNV].
24. Brandt, supra note 10. R
25. See Jack Bechta, Sports Agents: Myths & Tactics, NAT’L FOOTBALL POST,
https://nationalfootballpost.com/sports-agents-myths-tactics/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2019) [https://perma.cc/79BY-BE9N] (admonishing agents for providing loans to cli-
ents and prospective clients, as they encourage spending money not yet earned).
26. Karcher, supra note 11, at 753 (noting such purchases can include too many R
cars, plane tickets, hotels, flying friends to games, and homes in multiple cities).
27. See Bechta, supra note 25.
28. See id. (noting that agent Bechta loaned $25,000 to one client).
29. See La Canfora, supra note 20 (noting that some such loans are forgivable). R
This Article pertains to loans provided by agents to the athlete directly but agent
Greg Linton describes multiple occasions where an agency provided a loan to an ath-
lete’s family member with an expectation that the athlete would repay the loan
amount. See Greg Linton, “Que Sera, Sera” Just Another Day in Gotham..., BLOG-
SPOT: AGENT LINTON: THE INFORMATIVE AND ENTERTAINING VIEWS ON FOOTBALL,
BUSINESS, AND LIFE OF AGENT GREG LINTON (May 19, 2014), http://agentlinton.blog
spot.com/ [https://perma.cc/7JTL-TWB4] (noting that one such $50,000 loan was in-
terest-free and another was a five-figure “nice gesture” by an agency).
30. Davis, supra note 17, at 786 (stating that the draftee also spent $80,000 on a R
car).
31. See Andrew Brandt, Football’s Accounting Tricks, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.si.com/mmqb/2016/12/15/themmqb-business-football-an-
drew-brandt-contract-extensions-salary-cap-agents-recruiting-college [https://
perma.cc/R2WL-94ED] (describing various aspects of the business of professional
football).
32. See Anthony R. Caruso, NFL Agent: Real Talk About Agents and Amateurism,
SCARINCI HOLLENBECK (Dec. 1, 2014), https://scarincihollenbeck.com/law-firm-in-
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trol.”33 However, the prevalence of marketing guarantees has in-
creased as the NFL has enjoyed “an explosion in the marketability of
its athletes.”34 Marketing income can potentially “subsidize or even
supersede a rookie’s base salary,” particularly for players at the skills
positions (quarterback, running back, and wide receiver).35 A market-
ing guarantee is a creative method for an athlete agent to get money
to an athlete.36
Mechanically, an athlete agent provides a marketing guarantee to a
client by advancing a sum of money to the client that will be offset
against future marketing revenue the client earns.37 In this scenario,
the athlete not only hires an agent to negotiate contracts with profes-
sional organizations, but also to manage the athlete’s marketing op-
portunities, which is an increasingly common service for agents to
offer.38 In other words, “a marketing guarantee is an advance against
future marketing income on the player’s brand.”39 If an athlete agent
advances $100,000 to a client, the agent then keeps the initial $100,000
in marketing income the client generates.40 Subsequently, the athlete
and agent would enter a more traditional commission-based relation-
ship, wherein the agent, if handling the athlete’s marketing, typically
earns up to 20% of any paid, off-field opportunities.41 If the agent
cannot produce the guaranteed amount of marketing income, the ath-
lete still keeps the guaranteed amount.42 Thus, in the above example,
sights/entertainment-and-sports/nfl-agent-talks-amateurism [https://perma.cc/AZ5N-
CX6B] (providing recommendations on agent screening process).
33. Mullen, supra note 16 (noting that many agents believed marketing guarantees R
constitute inducements that the NFLPA should prohibit).
34. See Neil Stratton, Real Talk on Pre-Draft Marketing, SUCCEED IN FOOTBALL –




36. Jeremy Fowler, For NFL Prospects, Cost of Getting Drafted Can Surpass
$100K, ESPN (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.espn.com/blog/pittsburgh-steelers/post/_/
id/30615/for-nfl-prospects-cost-of-getting-drafted-can-surpass-100k [https://perma.cc/
V954-PDRR] (describing common pre-draft expenses).
37. See Andrew Brandt, An Agent’s Life Isn’t All Glamour, ESPN (Nov. 27, 2012),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/8681968/nfl-agent-life-all-glamour [https://
perma.cc/TX3W-3BLB]; see also Bechta, supra note 25.
38. See Wong et al., supra note 7, at 572 (noting agents also offer services includ- R
ing financial planning, tax advice, and estate planning).
39. See Caruso, supra note 32 (noting marketing guarantees allow profitable agen- R
cies to gain edge).
40. Bechta, supra note 25.
41. Darren Heitner, Report: Brett Hundley to Sign with Roc Nation Sports,
FORBES (Oct. 14, 2014, 10:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2014/
10/14/report-brett-hundley-to-sign-with-roc-nation-sports/#695fbf8969ac [https://
perma.cc/2KML-CQZW] (describing anticipated relationship between football player
Brett Hundley and agency Roc Nation Sports). The NFLPA caps an agent’s salary
commissions at 3% and permits agents “to charge up to 20 percent on endorsement
earnings . . . . ” See Matz, supra note 18. R
42. See Brandt, supra note 31.
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if the agency only secures $25,000 of future marketing income for the
athlete, the agency assumes the $75,000 difference as a “cost of doing
business.”43 Due to the great dollar amount exchanging hands, larger
agencies with plentiful resources are more likely to offer and utilize
marketing guarantees.44
The guarantee amounts typically vary between $25,000 and
$250,000 but have reached $2 million.45 Most potential first-round
draft picks receive marketing guarantees.46 Further, second- and
third-round draft picks routinely receive six-figure guarantee offers.47
In fact, during the 2014 college football season, rumors swirled that
Brett Hundley, the then UCLA quarterback and projected second-
round draft pick, would sign with rapper and entertainer Jay Z’s Roc
Nation Sports for marketing representation in large part because Roc
Nation offered a $1 million marketing guarantee.48 The Green Bay
Packers ultimately drafted Hundley in the fifth round.49
Given their prevalence, one may (correctly) assume that NFLPA
regulations and state athlete agent laws do not expressly forbid agents
from offering loans and marketing guarantees to prospective clients.
However, athlete agents and athletes should familiarize themselves
with these laws and consider them as well as other, perhaps less obvi-
ous, authorities prior to entering such transactions.
III. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT AUTHORITIES TO SCENARIO
WHEREBY AN ATHLETE AGENT PROVIDES A LOAN
OR MARKETING GUARANTEE
Myriad authorities apply to agents’ player recruiting.50 Many ath-
lete agents who offer loans and marketing guarantees are likely to
43. See Brandt, supra note 10. R
44. See id. (noting that larger agencies use marketing guarantees to separate them-
selves from smaller firms).
45. See Brandt, supra note 37; see also Bechta, supra note 25. A more recent esti-
mated range is between $10,000 and $50,000 with the disclaimer that it depends on the
caliber of athlete recruited. See Koesterman, supra note 21 (estimating possible pre- R
draft expenses for a draft prospect to total between $56,000 to $218,000).
46. See Greg Linton, So You Wanna Be a Sports Agent..., BLOGSPOT: AGENT LIN-
TON: THE INFORMATIVE AND ENTERTAINING VIEWS ON FOOTBALL, BUSINESS, AND
LIFE OF AGENT GREG LINTON (Oct. 2011), agentlinton.blogspot.com/2011/10/so-you-
wanna-be-sports-agent-part-1-so.html [https://perma.cc/PY7X-LETS].
47. See Mullen, supra note 16. R
48. See Heitner, supra note 41 (noting some Roc Nation clients sign with Roc
Nation for marketing and another agency for their contract advising).
49. See Mark Sessler, Packers Draft UCLA Quarterback Brett Hundley, NFL.COM
(May 2, 2015, 2:29 PM), www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000490444/article/packers-
draft-ucla-quarterback-brett-hundley [https://perma.cc/9GDB-X8VL].
50. See Masteralexis et al., supra note 19, at 87–88. Enforcement of these regula- R
tions, however, is lacking. See Chris Deubert, What’s a “Clean” Agent to Do? The
Case for a Cause of Action Against a Player’s Association, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (pointing out that “clean” agents face a disadvantage competing
against agents who fail to follow regulations).
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concern themselves most with NFLPA regulations and state athlete
agent laws based on the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”) and
its revised version.51 However, athlete agents who engage in these
transactions must also consider agency law and, if they are attorneys,
ethics regulations.
A. Application of NFLPA Regulations to Loans
and Marketing Guarantees
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) effectively gives
players associations the discretion to negotiate on behalf of their col-
leagues and, specifically “the authority to certify agents to negotiate”
players’ salaries.52 Thus, due to its status as a union, the NFLPA has
broad authority over athlete agents.53 In fact, most players associa-
tions, including the NFLPA, have rules for agent certification and reg-
ulation.54 More generally, “players association regulations tend to
define the athlete/agent relationship as fiduciary in nature.”55
NFLPA agent regulations include provisions intended to “level[ ]
the playing field in agents’ competition for clients.”56 Notably, NFLPA
agent regulations include a prohibition against agents “[p]roviding or
offering money or any other thing of value to any player or prospec-
tive player to induce or encourage that player to utilize his/her ser-
vices.”57 An agent violating this prohibition, or engaging in any other
prohibited conduct, is subject to disciplinary procedures.58 NFLPA
regulations further stipulate that an agent who provides an improper
inducement must reimburse any fee the agent charged and received
from the inducement recipient.59 However, the NFLPA regulation
prohibiting agents from providing inducements to clients is perhaps
the most commonly violated NFLPA regulation.60 The NFLPA does
51. See generally NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CON-
TRACT ADVISORS 8, § 3B(2) (2011) (amended 2016),  https://nflpaweb.blob.core.win
dows.net/media/Default/PDFs/Agents/RegulationsAmendedAugust2016.pdf  [https://
perma.cc/YW5G-76TR]; UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2000) (amended 2019).
52. Masteralexis et al., supra note 19, at 93. R
53. See Jamie E. Brown, The Battle the Fans Never See: Conflicts of Interest for
Sports Lawyers, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813, 832–33 (1994) (examining situations
unique to the sports agency industry that cause conflicts of interest).
54. Masteralexis et al., supra note 19, at 93. R
55. Davis, supra note 17, at 819 (citing example of MLBPA regulations stating that R
only individuals who can “reasonably be expected to carry out faithfully their impor-
tant fiduciary responsibilities will be entitled to certification”).
56. Id. (citing prohibition on improper inducements as example). However, the
ability of agents to permissibly provide benefits including marketing guarantees and
loans inherently favors larger agencies. See Brandt supra note 10.
57. NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 51, at 8, § 3B(2).
58. Id. at 8–11, § 3B.
59. Id. at 13, § 4B(5).
60. Deubert, supra note 50, at 21 (noting that agents customarily provide athletes
with money after signing them).
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not define “inducement” or “any other thing of value” in its
regulations.61
NFLPA regulations explicitly permit agents to provide loans to cli-
ents. Section 3(A)(6) requires agents to “file with the NFLPA . . . any
other agreement(s) for additional services that the Contract Advisor
has executed with the player, including, without limitation, agree-
ments or other relevant documents relating to loans, lines of credit, or
pre-combine or pre-draft services or benefits being provided to rookie
clients.”62 Regardless, at least one prominent athlete agent believes
agents should not provide loans to clients because of the message it
sends. Agent Jack Bechta, who admits that the most he has loaned a
client is $25,000, has publicly stated he is against agents loaning clients
money prior to the draft because it indicates to clients that it is accept-
able to have debt and borrow money before his clients earn it.63
Likewise, the NFLPA does not consider marketing guarantees to
constitute impermissible inducements and permits agents to offer
them to clients.64 Such offers, while seen by some as “nebulous ter-
rain, fraught with potential peril, complicated language and substan-
tial loopholes,” are nevertheless exempt from the NFLPA’s
prohibition on inducements.65 One academic characterizes offering
guaranteed marketing income as unethical and an abuse of the rule
against inducements, noting “the end result is the same,” regardless of
how the parties classify the transaction.66 At least one agent, attorney
Steve Persia, agrees, having stated publicly that he would characterize
a marketing agreement as an inducement (and “a joke”) and thus
does not see why the NFLPA allows them.67 More generally, Persia is
against marketing guarantees because they are “not the way to start a
player-agent relationship.”68 Other agents have expressed similar con-
61. While many commentators agree that the NFLPA’s agent regulations should
serve as a model for others because they are comprehensive and responsive to ongo-
ing problems, they are inadequate against unethical solicitation of collegiate student-
athletes. Jeffrey C. Meehan, Harvard or Hardball? An Examination of Ethical Issues
Faced by Lawyer-Agents, 21 SPORTS L.J. 45, 60 (2014) (stating that the NFLPA has
little incentive to penalize agents for unethical solicitation of collegiate student-
athletes).
62. NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 51, at 6, § 3A(6).
63. Bechta, supra note 25.
64. See Davis, supra note 17, at 790; see also Liz Mullen, NFLPA to Use Combine R
to Update Agents on Regs Overhaul, SPORTS BUS. J. (Feb. 16, 2015), https://www.
sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/02/16/Labor-and-Agents/Labor-and-A
gents.aspx [https://perma.cc/CC6E-D9AU] (describing NFLPA plans to overhaul
agent regulations in 2015).
65. La Canfora, supra note 20 (arguing there is too much leeway for money to R
exchange hands).
66. Deubert, supra note 50, at 21 (referring to agent signing bonuses as unethical
and an abuse of the rule against inducements).
67. Corriveau, supra note 21. R
68. Id.
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cerns privately to the NFLPA.69 Now-deceased, longtime NFL agent
Eugene Parker characterized marketing guarantees as “gimmicks”
that “sound sexy” but whose importance pales in comparison to the
contract with the team.70
Interestingly, many agents have privately argued for years that of-
fering marketing guarantees to players who play certain positions such
as offensive guard constitutes an inducement that the NFLPA should
prohibit because offensive guards rarely “generate much interest from
potential sponsors.”71 Further, second- and third-round draft picks
who play positions other than quarterback or running back, despite
routinely receiving six-figure marketing guarantees, are unlikely to
earn commensurate endorsement income.72 Thus, marketing guaran-
tees are “fertile ground for shady business.”73
In fact, in February 2014, several agents submitted a proposal to the
NFLPA that “no more than $25,000 should be allowed to exchange
hands between an agent and his client.”74 Thus, the proposal would
have banned loans, marketing guarantees, stipends, signing bonuses,
and similar arrangements in excess of $25,000.75 After those agents
made the proposal, the NFLPA distributed a general questionnaire to
agents regarding marketing guarantees.76 However, the NFLPA did
not adopt the proposal.
The agent industry revisited the idea of limiting inducements in Au-
gust of 2018 when 300 agents discussed, among other topics, the possi-
bility of adding an addendum designed to curb inducements from
69. See Mullen, supra note 64 (noting that agents with concern over marketing
guarantees believe them to be, “for practical purposes, an inducement”).
70. Mullen, supra note 16 (noting Parker’s list of “gimmicks” also included R
promises to give perks, jewelry, special trips, involvement in an entertainment project,
and access to rappers). A former San Antonio Spur, Parker went on to represent
several NFL megastars, including Deion Sanders, Emmitt Smith, and Larry Fitzger-
ald. #40 Eugene Parker, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/profile/eu-
gene-parker/#4b6876f97bb8 [https://perma.cc/3S8D-VE9K]. He helped negotiate
more than a billion dollars in contracts. Id.
71. Mullen, supra note 64 (pointing out that some players enjoy receiving guaran-
teed money from agents, and that players, not agents, run the NFLPA); see also
Fowler, supra note 36 (explaining that “only the fantasy football positions such as
quarterback, running back and wide receiver earn enough marketing dollars to make
[guarantees] worthwhile”).
72. See Mullen, supra note 16. Agents maintain that athletes often ask for market- R
ing guarantees. See id. For example, agent Greg Linton describes an occasion where
the father of a likely third-round draftee called Linton a year before the next draft
and described a series of anticipated expectations of the draftee’s agent-to-be includ-
ing a $50,000 marketing guarantee and a $25,000 line of credit. Linton, supra note 29.
73. La Canfora, supra note 20 (arguing agents should handle contract relations R
and not complicated financial dealings with clients). The same would likely hold true
for the lineman in the hypothetical at the outset of this Article.
74. Id. (noting NFLPA executive DeMaurice Smith encouraged such a proposal
from agents at the NFL Combine after hearing of numerous financial inducements).
75. Id. (describing the proposal as “a pretty good common sense place to start”).
76. See Mullen, supra note 64.
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agents to athletes to the Standard Representation Agreement.77
Agent Peter Schaffer, who led the call, circulated a proposed adden-
dum prior to the conference call.78 The addendum would prohibit
agents from providing marketing guarantees, preclude agents from
providing a player with a signing bonus of any amount, limit loans in
excess of $50,000 to rookie players, and require payback of such loans
within nine months.79  The NFLPA has yet to adopt or require the
addendum.
Dialogue regarding curbing inducements continued, however. At
the March 2019 annual players’ meeting, roughly 200 active NFL play-
ers unanimously passed a resolution dubbed the “inducement resolu-
tion.”80 Under the resolution, the NFLPA would, among other things,
implement a “cap on the amount of money that agents can recover
from any amount advanced to players” and require disclosure of any
money paid by an agent to a player.81 The resolution is not currently
effective, however, because the NFLPA has not set the cap amount.82
Thus, agents may continue to spend freely, including paying for pre-
draft training expenses, providing loans, and offering marketing guar-
antees.83 At best, this resolution would cap the amount agents could
eventually recover from a player.84 Thus, the resolution may deter
agents from offering large loans to potential clients because the reso-
lution would limit the amount the agent could eventually recover.
However, the resolution would not prevent or deter offering large
marketing guarantees because agents have no intention of recovering
marketing guarantee money.
77. See Darren Heitner, NFL Agents Discuss Creation of Agent Association and
Changes to NFLPA Rules, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Aug. 22, 2018), sportsagent-
blog.com/2018/08/22/nfl-agents-discuss-creation-of-agent-association-and-changes-to-
nflpa-rules/ [https://perma.cc/A2YV-BXAX] (summarizing conference call among
agents). The NFLPA requires agents and players to use a pre-printed Standard Rep-
resentation Agreement provided by the NFLPA. NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 51,
at 12, § 4A.
78. See Heitner, supra note 77 (noting that, while agents would like to limit in-
ducements, having a seat at NFLPA Executive Committee and Players Rep meetings
was top priority).
79. Id. For the proposed addendum, see Addendum to Standard Representation
Agreement for All NFL Players from Peter Schaffer to NFL Agents (Aug. 22, 2018)
(on file at https://www.scribd.com/document/386844336/SRA-Addendum-Proposed-
to-NFLPA-7-2018).
80. Darren Heitner, Inside the Heated Back-And-Forth Between A Group of
Agents and the NFLPA, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Mar. 16, 2019), sportsagentblog.com/
2019/03/16/inside-the-heated-back-and-forth-between-a-group-of-agents-and-the-
nflpa/ [https://perma.cc/S97R-6W7X] (noting that receiver Doug Baldwin moved for
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B. Application of State Athlete Agent Laws to Loans
and Marketing Guarantees
“The Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”), also known as the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NC-
CUSL”), which is now in its 124th year, provides non-partisan
legislation to states in order to bring clarity and stability to essential
areas of state statutory law.”85 In 2000, the ULC drafted the Uniform
Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”) to govern relations among student-
athletes, athlete agents, and universities.86 The UAAA is not binding
legislation, and states have discretion to adopt it in whole or in part.87
Forty-two states have enacted the UAAA.88
In July 2015, the ULC drafted the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents
Act (“RUAAA”) to address various issues and modernize the UAAA
in an “ever-evolving sports commercial marketplace.”89 Fourteen
states have enacted the RUAAA, and ten other states introduced it in
2019.90
The UAAA, RUAAA, and state athlete agent laws prohibit an
agent, “with the intent of inducing a student athlete to enter into an
agency contract,” from “furnishing anything of value to a student ath-
lete or another person before that athlete enters into an agency con-
tract . . . .”91 Thus, the UAAA and RUAAA’s bans on athlete agents
offering inducements to student-athletes mirror NFLPA regulations.
However, given the prevalence of loans and marketing guarantees in
player recruiting, the entities enforcing state athlete agent laws either
do not adequately enforce these laws or, like the NFLPA, do not con-
sider loans and marketing guarantees to constitute illicit induce-
ments.92 Just as with NFLPA regulations, it is difficult to see how
85. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, REVISED UNIFORM
ATHLETE AGENTS ACT (2015), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=6a97db74-446e-e102-f517-0bd54fb
b7ff4&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/N4GS-VXYE] (describing the ULC and its
functions) [hereinafter RUAAA].
86. Id. at 1 (providing reasons for drafting the UAAA).
87. Meehan, supra note 61, at 56–57 (pointing out that some believe UAAA is a
barrier advantaging large agencies).
88. Athletes Agent Act, Revised, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
committees/community-home?Communitykey=4d46906c-2d24-4ede-84ab-a57b40fa5c
37&tab-groupdetails [https://perma.cc/KB34-VFSJ] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (provid-
ing interactive map detailing individual states’ adoptions of athlete agent laws) [here-
inafter RUAAA Map].
89. Why Your State Should Adopt the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2015),
UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocu
mentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=a59a2fe8-009d-fdab-dcb1-402b39176bb3&forceDia
log=0 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X3TW-8GUH] (detailing benefits of
RUAAA).
90. RUAAA Map, supra note 88. R
91. RUAAA, supra note 85, at 2. R
92. Entities not enforcing laws is certainly a possibility as many feel as though
states do not adequately enforce agent laws. See, e.g., COMM’N ON COLLEGE BASKET-
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offering to furnish a sum of money to a prospective client, regardless
of whether it is a loan or an advance on future marketing income, is
not an “item of value” that the UAAA and RUAAA—and state laws
based on them—should prohibit.
C. Application of Agency Law to Loans and Marketing Guarantees
The fact that neither the NFLPA nor state athlete agent laws ex-
pressly forbid athlete agents from providing loans and marketing
guarantees is not surprising since, according to at least one expert,
most athlete agent regulations “subordinate the interests of both ath-
letes and their agents” to those of the NCAA.93 However, the athlete
agent industry is shortsighted if it stops its analysis of relevant authori-
ties on loans and marketing guarantees after looking only at NFLPA
regulations and state laws. Athlete agent behavior does not have to
violate an express authority to cause harm to an athlete.94 Agency law
provides some protection for athletes when they are part of an
agent–client relationship.
The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines “agency” as “the fiduci-
ary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests
assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”95 Over the past sev-
eral decades, athletes have become increasingly reliant on their
agents.96 Athlete agents “have a tremendous amount of power to-
day.”97 Given the key roles an agent serves in an athlete’s life, an ath-
BALL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COL-
LEGIATE BASKETBALL § 1C (2018), www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018CCBReport
Final_web_20180501.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9RX-7U8D] (issuing a report and recom-
mendations to NCAA Board of Governors, Division I Board of Directors, and
NCAA President Mark Emmert); see also Associated Press, AP Study: Laws for
Sports Agents Rarely Enforced, DENVER POST (Aug. 17, 2010, 3:04 AM), https://www
.denverpost.com/2010/08/17/ap-study-laws-for-sports-agents-rarely-enforced/ (last up-
dated May 5, 2016, 5:12 PM) [https://perma.cc/TV97-VT6A] (detailing survey finding
that more than half of the then forty-two states with agent laws had yet to revoke or
suspend a single license or invoke penalties of any sort).
93. Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA and SPARTA: How
America Should Reform its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True Agency Princi-
ples, 4 HARV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 145, 148 (2013) (arguing for change to athlete agent
laws to better protect athletes).
94. Karcher, supra note 11, at 739. R
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
96. See Scott R. Rosner, Conflicts of Interest and the Shifting Paradigm of Athlete
Representation, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 194, 197 (2004) (noting the myriad roles
agents play for clients including psychologist, babysitter, social planner, counselor,
finance manager, accountant, tax and estate planner, and attorney).
97. Patrick Connors et al., Panel III: Ethics and Sports: Agent Regulation, 14
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 747, 749 (2004) (emphasizing role of
agents in negotiating contracts between players and teams as well as emphasizing the
players’ needing someone besides family members in whom to trust).
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lete places great trust in his agent.98 Trust is fundamental to the
athlete–agent relationship.99 A professional football executive high-
lighted the importance of this trust, noting that a player has one ca-
reer, but an agent likely represents multiple athletes.100
The relationship between an athlete and an agent is based on ex-
press contract.101 In major professional sports leagues, this relation-
ship stems from representation agreements that describe the nature of
the services agents may perform on behalf of their principals (i.e., the
athletes).102 These contracts also express “basic duties and obligations
the parties owe each other.”103
Signing an agency representation agreement results in a fiduciary
relationship between a sports agent and his client.104 The obligations
agents owe to their clients are based upon the agency principle of ath-
lete agents aligning their incentives with the athletes they represent.105
An agent owes the duty to “exercise the utmost good faith, loyalty,
and honesty toward [the] principal.”106 Further, “[t]he duty of loyalty
obliges the agent to avoid conflicts of interest.”107 Law imposes the
fiduciary relationship “upon the agent because the very nature of the
agency relationship involves the principal entrusting his fortune, repu-
tation, and legal rights and responsibilities to his agent whose actions
. . . affect the economic well-being and reputation of the principal.”108
Further, “an agent has a duty not to deal with the principal as or on
behalf of an adverse party in a transaction connected with the agency
relationship.”109 More specifically, “[a]n agent is deemed to act as or
for an adverse party in a transaction when the agent has a substantial
economic interest in the party with whom the principal deals.”110 This
duty is formulated broadly.111 The duty is so broad that “[s]o long as
98. Masteralexis et al., supra note 19, at 69 (noting that violation of this trust can R
have substantial consequences including loss of eligibility, harm to college football
programs, and financial loss for the athlete).
99. Rosner, supra note 96, at 220 (describing athletes’ dependence on agents). R
100. Anderson, supra note 5 (describing agents who put their bottom lines ahead of R
their clients’ careers).
101. Davis, supra note 17, at 792. R
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Darren A. Heitner, Duties of Sports Agents to Athletes and Statutory Regu-
lation Thereof, 7 DARTMOUTH L.J. 246, 247 (2009) (explaining that the relationship
results from the athlete providing consent to the agent to act on the athlete’s behalf
yet be subject to athlete’s control).
105. See Masteralexis, et al., supra note 19, at 79 (likening agent–athlete relation- R
ship to that of worker employed by professional service firm).
106. Brown, supra note 53, at 824.
107. Rosner, supra note 96, at 229 (noting that agents must avoid actual and appar- R
ent conflicts).
108. Davis, supra note 17, at 793. R
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
110. Id. § 8.03 cmt. c.
111. Id. § 8.03 cmt. b.
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the transaction in which an agent acts as or on behalf of an adverse
party is connected with the agency relationship, the agent is subject to
the duty although the agent does not have direct or indirect responsi-
bility for conducting the transaction on behalf of the principal.”112 The
rationale behind this obligation stems from the agent’s “duty to the
principal to act loyally in the principal’s interest in all matters in con-
nection with the agency relationship.”113 This is because “an agent’s
self-interest in a transaction recommended to a client may systemati-
cally bias the quality of the recommendation.”114 Thus, agents may
not put themselves “in a situation in which there is an actual, or even
apparent, conflict between [their] interests and the interests of [their
clients].”115 This is due to the fact that “[w]hen an agent deals with the
principal on the agent’s own account, the agent’s own interests are
irreconcilably in tension with the principal’s interests because the in-
terest of each is furthered by action . . . that is incompatible with the
interests of the other.”116 Further, “[e]ven if the agent’s divided loy-
alty does not result in demonstrable harm to the principal, the agent
has breached the agent’s duty of undivided loyalty.”117
Jurisdictions analyze the propriety of transactions between agents
and principals in various ways. Courts in Texas have held that all
transactions between a fiduciary and his principal are presumptively
“void; therefore, the burden lies on the fiduciary to establish the valid-
ity” of any transaction involving him.118 Indiana courts also hold that
“transactions entered into during the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship are presumptively invalid,” adding that they are the “product of
undue influence.”119 In Indiana, courts look at whether the evidence
establishes “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, and (2) [that]
the questioned transaction between the two parties resulted in an ad-
vantage to the dominant party in whom the subordinate party had
reposed both their trust and confidence.”120 If the situation satisfies
both prongs, Indiana law imposes a presumption that the dominant
party’s undue and fraudulent influence resulted in the transaction and,
thus, the transaction is void.121 Further, Indiana law “presumes fraud
when a person with a fiduciary duty benefits from a questioned trans-
action.”122 Once the plaintiff establishes these facts, “the burden shifts
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. § 8.01 Reporter’s Notes b.
115. Karcher, supra note 11, at 758. R
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 cmt. b (2006).
117. Id.
118. In re Douglass, 2015 WL 6446305, at *27 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2015).
119. In re Estate of Wade, 768 N.E.2d 957, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
120. Id. at 961–62.
121. Id. at 962.
122. Id. at 963.
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to the dominant party in the relationship to rebut the presumption by
clear and unequivocal proof.”123
The breadth of the undivided loyalty duty “requires that an agent
disclose adverse interests to the principal so that the principal may
evaluate, as only the principal is situated to do, how best to protect
[his] interests in light of the agent’s interests.”124 There exist occasions
in which “[a] principal may consent to conduct by an agent that would
otherwise constitute a breach of the agent’s duty.”125 However, the
consent must meet several conditions for it to be valid. In obtaining
the principal’s consent for a specific act or transaction, the agent must:
(1) act in good faith; (2) with limited exceptions, disclose all material
facts the agent knows, has reason to know, or should know would rea-
sonably affect the principal’s judgment; and (3) otherwise deal fairly
with the principal.126
Given the foregoing analysis, it is hard to fathom a court upholding
the terms of a loan that an athlete agent provided to a client that the
client later challenged. Keeping in mind that a court applying agency-
law principles would closely scrutinize any transaction between an
athlete agent and his client, a loan between them would put the two in
adverse positions. Generally, a loan—assuming the athlete repays it—
is a win for the agency, not the athlete.127 For example, consider the
scenario where an athlete agent provides a loan to one of his clients
who is an undrafted, rookie free agent. The transaction may compro-
mise the athlete agent’s guidance when evaluating contract offers
from teams. So the client is better able to repay the loan, the agent
may advise his client to accept a short-term contract with a high aver-
age annual value as opposed to a longer-term, more lucrative offer
from another team. In doing so, the agent fails to act loyally in the
client’s interests even if there is no actual harm to the client. While the
agent may attempt to obtain the client’s informed consent to the loan,
the requirements for validity of the consent are steep, especially given
the unequal positions of the two parties.
Further, agency law would not look favorably on athlete agents pro-
viding marketing guarantees to their clients. In the first place, legal
scholars have noted that if an agent’s “compensation is a percentage
of the client’s endorsement income, there may be a conflict, because
the lawyer has a personal interest in the endorsement contract’s out-
123. Id. at 962.
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 8.06. Additional requirements apply for client consent to conduct by an
attorney that would otherwise breach the attorney’s duties of loyalty to the client. See
id. § 8.06 cmt. a; see also infra Section III.D.
127. Fowler, supra note 36 (noting that athletes often must repay the loan after
receiving a signing bonus from the team).
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come.”128 Agents who handle an athlete’s marketing are fiduciaries
under agency law and are thus “held to conflict of interest stan-
dards.”129 An endorsement opportunity may be inadvisable for sev-
eral reasons. However, “an agent’s self-interest in a transaction
recommended to a client may systematically bias the quality of the
recommendation.”130 For example, too many simultaneous endorse-
ment endeavors may weaken an athlete’s on-field career or future
marketability.131 Nevertheless, the agent “may advise the client to ac-
cept the endorsement so that the [agent] can collect his percentage
fee.”132 Providing a marketing guarantee only increases the likelihood
of an athlete agent acting—or being tempted to act—upon his own
interest to make up the guarantee amount by advising his client to
participate in too many marketing endeavors. Thus, the athlete agent
likely fails to uphold his duty of loyalty and to avoid conflicts of
interest.
When an agent breaches a fiduciary duty of loyalty, agency law pro-
vides distinctive remedies to the principal.133 Potential remedies in a
successful breach of fiduciary duty tort claim include punitive dam-
ages.134 Further, courts allocate burdens of proof “differently in cases
alleging breach of fiduciary obligation than in civil litigation gener-
ally.”135 Also, “a different limitation period may apply, and it may not
begin to run until the principal discovers the breach of duty.”136
The application of agency law should give great pause to athlete
agents who consider providing loans or marketing guarantees to cli-
ents, as courts are unlikely to uphold challenges to them, which
greatly exposes athlete agents’ pocketbooks and reputations. As the
following Section shows, ethics regulations should serve as an addi-
tional deterrent for attorneys who serve as athlete agents and contem-
plate engaging in such transactions.
128. Robert E. Fraley & F. Russell Harwell, The Sports Lawyer’s Duty to Avoid
Differing Interests: A Practical Guide to Responsible Representation, 11 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 165, 187 (1989) (listing potential conflicts of interest for attorney-
agents who handle a client’s marketing).
129. Id. at 189.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 Reporter’s Notes b (AM. LAW
INST. 2006).
131. See Fraley & Harwell, supra note 128, at 187. R
132. Id.
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
134. See Edelman, supra note 93, at 161 (noting difficulty of success of such claims). R
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
136. Id.
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D. Application of Attorney Ethics Regulations to Attorney-Agents
Who Offer Loans and Marketing Guarantees
to Prospective Clients137
When selecting their agents, athletes increasingly turn to attor-
neys.138 Attorneys comprise more than half of all agents representing
professional athletes.139 The percentage of professional football ath-
letes who select attorneys to serve as their agents is even higher.140
An agent–client relationship differs in many ways from the tradi-
tional attorney–client relationship.141 Consequently, many attorneys
acting as sports agents incorrectly assume their agent activities are
not governed by legal ethics rules.142 However, when admitted to a
state bar, an attorney is subject to that state bar’s professional respon-
sibility rules.143 Further, many courts have held that ethical rules
do in fact govern the attorney-agent.144 Ethics regulations likewise
137. Some have pointed out that the Model Rules prohibit attorney-agents from
soliciting any clients, which includes athletes. See Karcher, supra note 11, at 748–49 R
(citing rationale that the potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person or telephone
contact by fiduciary with a prospective client known to need services). This Section
focuses, however, on the offering of loans and marketing guarantees by attorney-
agents and the application of ethics regulations to such transactions.
138. Fraley & Harwell, supra note 128, at 170–71 (explaining competition in athlete R
representation by legal professionals will likely mirror existing competition among
non-attorney agents).
139. See Melissa Neiman, Fair Game: Ethical Considerations in Negotiation by
Sports Agents, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 123, 123 (2007) (noting that it is not a
requirement for the agent to also be a licensed attorney).
140. See Fraley & Harwell, supra note 128, at 170. R
141. Rosner, supra note 96, at 217 (explaining that the agent–client relationship is R
not a “traditional personal representative relationship”).
142. See Brown, supra note 53, at 814. Because attorney-agents often ignore the
possibility of conflicting representation, and it is often difficult, if not impossible to
prove, the issue of conflicts of interest for attorney-agents should be closely scruti-
nized. Id.
143. Neiman, supra note 139, at 129 (explaining further that state bar authorities R
may sanction attorneys whose business practices run afoul of these rules). Note, how-
ever, that state bars have not aggressively pursued the few claims athletes have made
against their agents. Davis, supra note 17, at 806. R
144. Neiman, supra note 139, at 129 (citing and summarizing state court cases from R
Arizona and Ohio). Bar association rules are inapplicable to non-attorneys, thus cre-
ating a regulatory disparity between attorney-agents and non-attorney-agents.
Deubert, supra note 50, at 17 (suggesting a possible remedy of considering athlete R
agent business as practicing law, thus meaning all agents must be attorneys); see also
Jeremy J. Geisel, Disbarring Jerry Maguire: How Broadly Defining “Unauthorized
Practice of Law” Could Take the “Lawyer” Out of “Lawyer-Agent” Despite the Cur-
rent State of Athlete Agent Legislation, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 225, 245 (2007)
(providing suggestions for “bridging the competitive gap” between attorney and non-
attorney agents); see also Mark Doman, Attorneys as Athlete-Agents: Reconciling the
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct with the Practice of Athlete Representation, 5 TEX.
REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 37, 38–39 (2003) (arguing that Model Rules should be
amended such that they do not apply to athlete representation). For a comprehensive
discussion on attorneys as distinctive agents, meaning they are officers of the court
and members of a self-regulating profession and thus subject to duties distinct from
other agents, see Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer As Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
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bind attorneys who provide endorsement negotiation services for
clients.145
Thus, in addition to agency law discussed above, attorney-agents
must follow the Model Code of Professional Responsibility or Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), whichever is applica-
ble in their state.146 The vast majority of states have adopted the
Model Rules, which “further the overriding values of the legal profes-
sion.”147 The Model Rules “represent a responsible approach to the
ethical practice of law and are consistent with professional obligations
imposed by, for example, constitutional, corporate, tort, fiduciary and
agency law.”148 For clients who have sought an attorney’s counsel,
“application of these rules adds a further measure of protection and
enforcement.”149
One of the main policy considerations behind the conflict of interest
rules, which is also a fundamental tenet of the attorney–client rela-
tionship, is “unimpaired ‘zealous’ loyalty to the client’s interests.”150
Note however that, “various interests in the sports context may impair
the requisite vigorous representation.”151 Additional standards con-
templated by attorney-ethics regulations that seem particularly appli-
cable to attorney-agents, and their highly competitive industry,
include “rules governing the provision of competent representation,
diligent representation, solicitation, and conflicts of interest.”152 The
conflict of interest problems facing attorney-agents are especially
unique.153
301, 301–02 (1998) (illustrating the significance of agency and its limitations in the
legal profession).
145. Fraley & Harwell, supra note 128, at 188–89 (describing negotiation of en- R
dorsement contracts as a law-related occupation).
146. Davis, supra note 17, at 805 (explaining that violation of these standards may R
render attorney subject to discipline by state bar association). I acknowledge there are
some who feel that legal ethics rules may not automatically apply to an attorney-
agent, especially in situations where the agent does not provide legal advice to the
client. See, e.g., Jack Marshall, The Truth About Scott Boras, HARDBALL TIMES (Jan.
28, 2009), https://www.fangraphs.com/tht/the-truth-about-scott-boras/ [https://
perma.cc/N6KJ-KM2C] (stating that it is unsettled whether agent’s activities consti-
tute practice of law). However, both case law and ethics opinions state that attorneys
acting as sports agents are bound by ethics regulations. See Connors et al., supra note
97, at 780 (noting that many agents who are attorneys fail to follow the Model Rules). R
147. Rosner, supra note 96, at 218 (specifying that forty-two states as well as the
District of Columbia have adopted the Model Rules). Due to their prevalence, this
Article focuses on the application of the Model Rules as opposed to the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.
148. Tamara L. Barner, Show Me the...Ethics?:  The Implications of the Model Rules
of Ethics on Attorneys in the Sports Industry, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 519, 519
(2003) (analyzing application of Model Rules to attorney-agents).
149. Id.
150. Brown, supra note 53, at 827.
151. Fraley & Hartwell, supra note 128, at 173.
152. Davis, supra note 17, at 805–06 (noting that state bars have not been aggres- R
sive in pursuing complaints by athletes against agents).
153. Brown, supra note 53, at 814.
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When considering the provision of an inducement by an athlete
agent to a prospective client through the lens of legal ethics regula-
tions, one media member said:
There isn’t a bar association in the country that would allow a law-
yer to land a client with the aid of gifts or monies (signing bonus,
marketing guarantee or otherwise), much less set up scenarios
where upward of a million dollars changes hands legally. In fact, it is
strictly prohibited in all 50 states as it would naturally lead to con-
flicts of interest, impropriety and unprofessionalism. So why not
have the same apply to these player/agent relationships?154
More specifically, by providing a loan or marketing guarantee to a
client, an attorney-agent implicates two Model Rules prohibitions: (1)
attorneys may not enter business transactions with clients absent cer-
tain conditions and (2) except in limited circumstances, attorneys may
“not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pend-
ing or contemplated litigation.”155
1. The Model Rules Prohibit Attorneys from Entering Business
Transactions with Clients Absent Certain Conditions156
An attorney’s “legal skill and training, together with the relation-
ship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the pos-
sibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business . . .
transaction with a client.”157 Model Rule 1.8 pertains to conflicts of
interest and creates several requirements for situations where an at-
torney seeks to enter a transaction with a client, “even when the trans-
action is not closely related to the subject matter of the
representation.”158 The Comment to Model Rule 1.8 specifies that a
loan is an example of a transaction between an attorney and client to
which Model Rule 1.8 applies.159 Subsection (a) prohibits attorneys
from entering business transactions with clients unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the in-
terest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably un-
derstood by the client; (2) the client is advised in writing of the de-
sirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek
the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and (3)
the client gives informed consent, in writing signed by the client, to
the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the
transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client
in the transaction.160
154. La Canfora, supra note 20. R
155. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.8(a), (e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
156. Id.
157. Id. r. 1.8(a) cmt. 1.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. r. 1.8.
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The aforementioned, longtime agent Eugene Parker believed that
“[m]ost rookies don’t have any idea how to make a good, quality busi-
ness decision.”161 An attorney-agent’s client is often young and does
not possess the “legal savvy and experience to make educated deci-
sions concerning legal representation and legal strategy.”162 He either
recently graduated college or left college prior to graduation to pursue
a professional athletic career.163 Despite his youth, every rookie ath-
lete is “thrust at a young age into an industry where his talents and
marketability are often earning him millions of dollars a year.”164 Ath-
letes are often inexperienced in the fields of business and negotiation
and are thus susceptible to exploitation by agents.165 Further, loan and
marketing guarantee transactions between athlete agents and clients
are complicated.166 Many athlete agents use the “naivety of [athletes]
to their advantage by giving players financial inducements in order to
win over their business.”167
Given this dynamic, attorney-agents who provide loans or market-
ing guarantees will likely have a tough time satisfying the Model Rule
1.8(a)(1) requirement that they disclose the loan or marketing guaran-
tee transaction in a manner that the athlete could have reasonably
understood. Recent transactions between two of the biggest names in
the professional football industry serve as an example. A few years
ago, “complicated” financial dealings between star wide receiver
DeSean Jackson and his now-former agent Drew Rosenhaus became a
mainstream conversation in the industry.168 Through a series of docu-
mented loans, Jackson could have owed Rosenhaus as much as
$736,415, according to an NFLPA arbitration ruling on the grievance
between the two.169 Of this amount, $361,415 constituted remaining
unpaid loans that Jackson “questioned whether . . . [the loans] might
be gifts from Drew Rosenhaus to Jackson that were intended to bol-
ster their deteriorating business relationship.”170 Thus, Jackson
claimed the loans constituted a financial inducement to stay with
161. Mullen, supra note 16. R
162. Brown, supra note 53, at 814.
163. Id. at 837.
164. Id. (noting this athlete is often bombarded with decisions to make). Thus, it is
important for athletes to understand that agent misconduct can lead to financially
disastrous consequences for their clients. Davis, supra note 17, at 783–84 (citing exam- R
ple of football agent Sean Jones and his “financial misdealings” involving two clients).
165. Masteralexis et al., supra note 19, at 80 (explaining that a player is at risk of R
exploitation by an agent who makes decisions without player’s input).
166. See La Canfora, supra note 20 (describing dealings between wide receiver R
DeSean Jackson and agent Drew Rosenhaus).
167. Karcher, supra note 11, at 753 (citing statistics on likelihood that a high school R
athlete will play a game in the big leagues).
168. La Canfora, supra note 20 (noting the NFLPA contemporaneously issued a R
memo to agents “vowing increased discipline for those [failing] to uphold [the] rules
governing the signing of players”).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Rosenhaus as Jackson pursued a new contract.”171 Given the large
amount of money at stake, Jackson had significant incentive to under-
stand the transaction, but he did not (or could not). Should a transac-
tion with a client come into dispute, the Rosenhaus–Jackson
transactions serve as a prime example of the difficulty that an attor-
ney-agent will have in satisfying the requirement that he disclosed it in
a manner that his client could reasonably understand. One may argue
that a marketing guarantee transaction would be even more difficult
for a client to understand than the loan (or inducement) at issue in the
Rosenhaus–Jackson dispute.
Attorney-agents who engage in business transactions with clients,
such as loans and marketing guarantees, must also satisfy Model Rule
1.8(a) documentation requirements. These requirements include: (1)
full disclosure and transmission of the transaction in writing in a man-
ner that the client can reasonably understand; (2) advising the client
of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel
on the transaction; and (3) the client’s “informed consent, in writing
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the
lawyer’s role in the transaction.”172 An attorney-agent who provides a
loan or marketing guarantee faces a tall task in attempting to satisfy
these requirements. Given the likely youth and inexperience of his
client, attorney-agents will likely struggle to show they disclosed the
transaction in a manner his client could reasonably understand or that
his client gave informed consent.
Further, the Comment to Model Rule 1.8 requires the attorney-
agent, when necessary, to discuss: (1) the “material risks of the pro-
posed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer’s in-
volvement,” (2) “the existence of reasonably available alternatives,”
and (3) “why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable.”173
Thus, attorney-agents who provide loans to clients must discuss with
them the existence of alternative loan sources, for example. Similarly,
attorney-agents who offer marketing guarantees must discuss the
availability of other marketing representation options with clients.
When an attorney fails to satisfy Model Rule 1.8(a) requirements re-
garding transactions with clients, the result is a rebuttable presump-
tion that the transaction is void as against public policy.174
The Comment to Model Rule 1.8 explains that the risk is greatest
when the client expects the attorney to “represent the client in the
transaction itself or when the lawyer’s financial interest otherwise
poses a significant risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client
171. Id. (noting the remaining amount of $155,000 was unpaid agent fees).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
173. Id. r. 1.8 cmt. 2.
174. ELLEN J. BENNETT & HELEN W. GUNNARSSON, AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 169 (9th ed. 2019) (citing Calvert v. May-
berry, No. 16SC413, 2019 WL 1510451 (Colo. Apr. 8, 2019)).
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will be materially limited by the lawyer’s financial interest in the trans-
action.”175 This risk of an attorney’s financial self-interest exists when
attorney-agents provide marketing guarantees to clients. For example,
an attorney-agent’s provision of a large sum of money as an advance
on future marketing income may incentivize the attorney-agent to ar-
range for marketing opportunities for the client that are too numer-
ous—or less than desirable—so as to bring in marketing revenue to
make up the attorney-agent’s guarantee advance amount. Such a situ-
ation results in an additional requirement for attorney-agents, as they
must comply not only with the requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a), but
also with Model Rule 1.7. Under Model Rule 1.7, the attorney-agent
must disclose the risks associated with the attorney’s dual role, such as
the risk that the attorney-agent “will structure the transaction or give
legal advice in a way” that favors the attorney-agent’s “interests at the
expense of the client.”176
Moreover, the attorney-agent must secure the client’s informed
consent.177 In some cases, the attorney-agent’s interests “may be such
that Rule 1.7 will preclude the [attorney-agent] from seeking the cli-
ent’s consent to the transaction.”178 In that case, even informed client
consent may not cure the conflict of interest that would exist as a re-
sult of the transaction.179 Thus, the attorney must either avoid the
transaction or comply with conditions designed to protect the client.180
If the Model Rules’ provisions on business transactions between at-
torneys and clients do not deter attorney-agents from providing loans
and marketing guarantees to clients, then the rationale behind the
Model Rules’ stance on attorneys providing financial assistance to cli-
ents should definitely dissuade such transactions.
2. With Limited Exceptions, the Model Rules Prohibit Attorneys
from Providing Financial Assistance to Clients in
Connection with Pending or Contemplated
Litigation181
An attorney-agent providing a loan or marketing guarantee to a cli-
ent requires analysis of another Model Rule 1.8 provision. Generally,
attorneys “may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings
brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing
loans to clients for living expenses.”182 If one of these scenarios were
to occur, it “would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not





180. See id. r. 1.8(a).
181. Id. r. 1.8(e).
182. Id. r. 1.8(e) cmt. 10.
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otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too
great a financial stake in the litigation.”183 To safeguard against these
dangers, Model Rule 1.8(e) prohibits attorneys from providing “finan-
cial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation”184 except in two (very limited) circumstances.185 Attorneys
“may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”186 Also, at-
torneys representing “indigent client[s] may pay court costs and ex-
penses of litigation on behalf of the client[s].”187
A trilogy of state court cases involving state bar association rules
based on Model Rule 1.8(e) illustrates the application of and rationale
behind the Model Rule prohibition on attorneys providing financial
assistance to clients. In 1995, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held
that an “attorney’s loans to [an] indigent client for personal mainte-
nance pending resolution of [his] personal injury claim violated prohi-
bition against providing financial assistance other than court costs and
expenses of litigation.”188 Like Model Rule 1.8(e), the relevant Missis-
sippi Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited an attorney from ad-
vancing “necessary and essential living and medical expenses” to a
client “during the course of litigation in order to maintain the viability
of the client’s claim.”189 In its opinion, the Mississippi Supreme Court
examined how other jurisdictions decided the issue, noting that the
majority of states facing the issue held that the advancement of funds
beyond court costs violates ethical regulations.190 The rationale be-
hind its ruling, according to the Court, included avoiding the potential
dangers of an attorney “hav[ing] his own pocketbook in mind as he
handles the litigation” of a client who owes him money.191 For exam-
ple, the attorney may “settle for an amount sufficient to cover the loan
to his client, while foregoing the risk of a trial where his client could
recover a larger amount or lose everything.”192  Thus, the attorney
“should not face this risk to independent judgment.”193 The Court
went on to state its concern that “unregulated lending to clients would
generate unseemly bidding wars for cases and inevitably lead to fur-
ther denigration of our civil justice system.”194 Thus, the Court pri-
vately reprimanded the attorney who made the loan.195
183. Id.
184. Id. r. 1.8(e)
185. Id. r. 1.8(e)(1)–(2).
186. Id. r. 1.8(e)(1).
187. Id. r. 1.8(e)(2).
188. Miss. Bar v. Attorney HH, 671 So.2d 1293, 1293 (Miss. 1995).
189. Id. at 1294.
190. Id. at 1296.
191. Id. at 1296–97.
192. Id. at 1297.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1298.
195. Id.
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A similar Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (“ORPC”) pro-
vision was at issue in a 2000 case decided by the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Bar Association “alleged one count of mis-
conduct warranting discipline against respondent attorney, Donald E.
Smolen.”196 The Association alleged that Smolen violated the prohibi-
tion against providing financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation pursuant to ORPC 1.8(e).197
During his representation of the client, Smolen loaned the client
$1,200 for living expenses.198 In its opinion, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma stated that ORPC 1.8(e) “unambiguously prohibit[s] a law-
yer from advancing living expenses to clients.”199 The Court noted
that the purposes of the prohibition against attorneys providing finan-
cial assistance to clients for living expenses include preventing “evils”
such as:
(1) clients selecting a lawyer based on improper factors, and (2)
conflicts of interest, including compromising a lawyer’s independent
judgment in the case and creating the potentially conflicting roles of
the lawyer as both lawyer and creditor with divergent interests.200
Smolen received a sixty-day suspension from practicing law.201
A 2003 Connecticut state court considered the application of Con-
necticut’s version of Model Rule 1.8(e) to a situation where attorneys
provided financial assistance to clients in connection with pending liti-
gation “by providing bus tokens to clients for transportation to medi-
cal appointments and by advancing medical costs to clients and to
providers for physicians’ treatment, prescriptions, and medical sup-
plies.”202 The Court noted that “[i]t [was] not a defense to an ethical
violation that the attorney did not act in bad faith or intend to violate
the code.”203 The Court disagreed with the attorneys’ argument that
medical-related costs constitute “court costs and expenses of litiga-
tion,” which Connecticut’s version of Model Rule 1.8(e)(1) permits
attorneys to advance to clients.204 The Court, in concluding that attor-
neys may not advance medical expenses to clients, based its decision
on rationale including: (1) ethics rules preclude attorneys “from entic-
ing clients with the promise of monetary advances”; (2) ethics rules
afford attorneys protection from client assistance requests; (3) ethics
rules shelter attorneys from the competition of other attorneys agree-
196. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 17 P.3d 456, 457 (Okla. 2000).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 458.
200. Id. at 462. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma cited Miss. Bar v. Attorney HH,
discussed supra notes 188–95. R
201. Smolen, 17 P.3d at 464.
202. Rubenstein v. Statewide Grievance Comm., No. CV020516965S, 2003 WL
21499265, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2003) (internal citation omitted).
203. Id.
204. Id. at *4, *6.
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able to giving monetary assistance to clients; and (4) client loans could
place the attorney in the conflicted roles of counselor and creditor,
thus encouraging the attorney to steer the litigation to protect the at-
torney’s welfare.205
While the language of Model Rule 1.8(e) expressly forbids attor-
neys from providing financial assistance to clients in connection with
pending or contemplated litigation, the rationales behind the prohibi-
tion are appropriate for the scenario whereby an attorney who serves
as an athlete agent provides financial assistance to clients via loans
and marketing guarantees. First, the increasingly common scenario in
which an athlete chooses representation based on the size of the loan
or marketing guarantee, as opposed to contract negotiating acumen, is
undesirable.206 Further, an attorney-agent who provides a loan or
marketing guarantee to a client possesses too great a financial stake in
the representation of the athlete. For example, an attorney-agent who
provides a loan to a free-agent client may drive the client to the big-
gest immediate payday via a contract with a large signing bonus as
opposed to a potentially more lucrative long-term, incentive-laden
contract offer from another organization that would provide the ath-
lete with more long-term security. In helping the client decide which
offer to accept, the attorney-agent’s interest in assisting the client de-
termine which offer is best for the client conflicts with the agent’s own
interest in the client’s ability to repay the loan.
Likewise, an attorney-agent who provides a client a marketing guar-
antee suddenly possesses too great of a financial stake in the client’s
career. The guarantee transaction may incentivize the attorney-agent,
who can earn up to 20% of a client’s marketing income compared to
up to 3% of a client’s salary, to arrange for too many or undesirable
marketing appearances in an attempt to make up the amount of the
advance.207 In what is (hopefully) an extreme example, an attorney-
agent who provides a large marketing guarantee to a defensive line-
man may encourage the lineman to accept a marketing opportunity
from a car dealership in the lineman’s hometown that requires the
athlete to sign autographs for $10.00 apiece at the dealership on a Sat-
urday morning in the summer. The lineman’s time may be better spent
training or resting; however, the attorney-agent may be more con-
cerned with making up the guarantee amount he advanced to his cli-
ent, who is not otherwise very marketable.208
205. Id. at *5.
206. See Mullen, supra note 16, for agents voicing frustration with the current
recruiting climate in which athletes choose representation based on inducements, see
also Corriveau, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
207. See Matz, supra note 18 (discussing NFLPA maximum percentages permitted).
208. See Fowler, supra note 36, for reference to marketability of individuals who
play certain positions. In some instances, agents are more interested in how their cli-
ents can benefit the agents financially instead of their best possible playing scenarios.
Stacey B. Evans, Sports Agents: Ethical Representatives or Overly Aggressive Adversa-
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Unfortunately, “many athletes blindly accept their agents’ advice,”
assuming that agents only look out for their clients’ best interests.209
Model Rule 1.8(e) seeks to prevent such scenarios and protect clients
from attorneys with conflicted interests. The rationales behind Model
Rule 1.8(e) are transferable to the scenario in which an attorney-agent
provides loans or marketing guarantees to clients.
IV. CONCLUSION: BASED ON AGENCY LAW AND ATTORNEY
ETHICS REGULATIONS RATIONALES, ATHLETES AND AGENTS
SHOULD BE LEERY OF ENGAGING IN LOAN AND MARKETING
GUARANTEE TRANSACTIONS, AND THE NFLPA AND INDIVIDUAL
STATES SHOULD EXPRESSLY PROHIBIT THEM
Regarding conflicts of interest, super-agent Jimmy Sexton has
stated, “I can see where someone in academic law might see [conflicts
of interest] as a problem, but they don’t work in the business, so they
don’t know the rules of the business. . . . We know the rules. . . . I
don’t think it’s a problem.”210 The rules to which Sexton likely refers
are NFLPA regulations and state athlete agent laws, both of which
prohibit athlete agents from providing inducements but neither of
which forbids loans and marketing guarantees. However, to conclude
analysis on these common transactions at considering only these two
authorities is shortsighted. Complete analysis must include application
of agency law and attorney ethics regulations.
Agency law seeks to protect the interests of principals, applies to all
athlete agents who negotiate their clients’ marketing endeavors, and,
stated generally, seeks to prevent transactions between agents and
their clients in which their interests conflict and jeopardize agents’
loyalty. Thus, agency law disapproves of athlete agents providing
loans and marketing guarantees.
Likewise, attorney ethics regulations apply to attorneys who re-
present athletes, including for marketing endeavors. With limited ex-
ceptions, the Model Rules prohibit attorneys from engaging in
business transactions with clients and would prohibit attorney-agents
from providing loans and marketing guarantees to clients. Further, the
rationales behind the Model Rules’ prohibition on attorneys providing
financial assistance to clients in connection with contemplated or
ries?, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 91, 101 (2010) (advocating that athletes pay closer
attention to agents’ educational backgrounds and highlighting benefits of legal
education).
209. Evans, supra note 208, at 125 (pointing out that agents may possess self-con-
cerns including pride, image, and money).
210. Anthony L. Salvador, The Regulation of Dual Representation in the NFL, 13
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 63, 79 (2011) (foootnote omitted) (proposing solution to
practice of dual representation of NFL coaches and players). For background on Sex-
ton and his intimate involvement in the tangled web of football representation, see
Joshua Lens, When a College Coach’s Agent Recruits the Coach’s Players: Potential
Legal and NCAA Ramifications, 26 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 3–5 (2019).
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pending litigation apply seamlessly to the scenario whereby an athlete
agent provides loans and marketing guarantees.
Thus, the NFLPA and individual states should expressly prohibit
athlete agents from providing loans and marketing guarantees to cli-
ents. Doing so would have positive effects including elimination of
confusion and helping put attorney-agents and non-attorney agents on
a level playing field. It would also further the goals of NFLPA agent
regulations by promoting competition among agencies, protecting ath-
letes from agents with conflicted interests, protecting agents from cli-
ent requests for funds, stopping the practice of athletes receiving
money that they have yet to earn, and eliminating the increasingly
common tendency of athletes signing with the highest agent bidder as
opposed to the best contract negotiator. Besides, there is a large seg-
ment of agents who desire this prohibition.211 Further, since bar as-
sociations do not have jurisdiction over non-attorneys, it would be
unfair to attorney-agents to count on them to police agents who pro-
vide loans and marketing guarantees to clients.212 Rather, the NFLPA
and individual states should adopt express prohibitions on such trans-
actions between all agents and their clients.
211. See, e.g., Mullen, supra note 16, for discussion of segment of agent industry
that desires such change.
212. Bar associations may not possess the time or resources to conduct inquiries
into allegations of agents violating these rules. Rosner, supra note 96, at 238. Further, R
bar associations typically only investigate cases in which facts are clear, a situation
often untrue of allegations involving agents. Id. Additionally, bar associations usually
focus investigations on violations involving less privileged clients who require protec-
tion from unscrupulous attorneys, and thus may not have incentive to pursue allega-
tions involving more privileged athletes. Id. However, attorney-agents and their
athlete clients currently experience a low level of accountability for attorney-agents
concerning conflicts of interests, while the ramifications for athletes can be extraordi-
narily high. Brown, supra note 53, at 814. Regardless, some individuals who were
attorneys have left the practice of law to become full-time athlete agents and avoid
more restrictive regulations applicable only to attorney-agents. Jamie P.A. Shulman,
The NHL Joins In: An Update on Sports Agent Regulation in Professional Team
Sports, 4 SPORTS L.J. 181, 202 (1997) (citing Michael A. Weiss, The Regulation of
Sports Agents: Fact or Fiction?, 1 SPORTS L.J. 329, 349 (1994) (noting inequity be-
tween attorney-agents with responsibilities for following legal ethics regulations and
non-attorney agents)). Conversely, at least one now-former attorney-agent, Mark
Rodgers, stopped serving as an agent due to his unwillingness to compete against
agents willing to engage in illegal behavior that may incentivize him to engage in
actions that could result in disbarment. See Meehan, supra note 61, at 46 (examining
whether a legal education hinders an attorney-agent’s progress in athlete
representation).
